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Közgazdász körökben megszokott a költség-hatékonysági elemzést elsõsorban a
neoklasszikus jóléti közgazdaságtan (welfare economics) köntösébe bújtatni, az ext-
ra-jóléti valójában egy olyan nézõpont kialakításának módszere, amelybe beletar-
toznak a jólét hagyományos forrásai (és még azok hasznosságmutatói is), de ugyan-
akkor extra, ugyanolyan értelemben, mint ahogyan az extra-szenzoros érzékelés
olyan érzékelés, amely meghaladja a megszokottat. Ezen további elemek közé tarto-
zik természetesen az egészség. A megengedhetõség/finanszírozhatóság (affordabil-
ity) fogalomra nem létezik közgazdasági meghatározás. Néha a szolgáltatásvásárlási
tervek feletti ellenõrzés kifejezésére használják, s általában a nem engedhetjük meg
magunknak tagadásban nyilvánul meg, de ez azért nem sok közgazdászra vonatko-
zik. A jelenlegi szövegkörnyezetben azonban, a szó jelentése inkább azon döntésre vo-
natkozik, hogy valamit nem éri meg megvásárolni. A közpénzbõl finanszírozott
egészségügyi szolgáltatásvásárlás esetében ez azt jelenti, hogy a más (társadalmi)
programokból vagy lakossági fogyasztásból származó hasznot nagyobbnak értékelik,
mint az adott programból (illetve a program adott kiterjedése mellett) nyerhetõt. Ez
egy olyan döntés, melynek meghozatalában a közgazdászok is részt vehetnek. Nem
tûnik azonban jó ötletnek az egészségügyi közgazdászok bevonása a döntéshozásba,
fõleg, ha a közéletben betöltött szerepük az egészségügyi szektort érinti, mivel nem
rendelkeznek sem az ilyen ítéletekhez (beleértve az értékítéleteket) szükséges legitimi-
tással, sem azokkal a technikai ismeretekkel, amelyek ahhoz kellenek, hogy a politi-
kailag illetékeseket tanáccsal lássák el. Ebbõl úgy tûnhet, hogy az egészségügyi köz-
gazdászok illetékessége normális esetben csak a szektoron belüli döntésekre vonat-
kozna, ahol mind a nyereség mind a költség az életév nyereség/veszteség tükrében
ítélhetõ meg, illetve ahol a maximalizálás és az igazságos elosztás kérdését az egész-
ségügyben elért eredmény, a ráfordítás és a felhasznált technológia határozza meg.
Nem meglepõ tehát, hogy az olyan szervek, mint a NICE inkább az egészség maxima-
lizálását, mint a jólét maximalizálását tûzi ki célul (Pareto-elv), és határozottan tagad-
ják, hogy döntéseiket a megengedhetõség/finanszírozhatóság irányítja.
OF WHAT ARE WE SPEAKING?
In the standard approach to CEA, which I call 'welfarist', the approach is a priori, the
general objective of expected utility maximisation is usually asserted, the value content of
policy is taken to be preference-based (and only preference-based), the criterion for a
social improvement is the Pareto (or potential Pareto) improvement, and the role of the
economist is essentially that of advising those responsible for policy as to how best to
improve existing resource allocations in the face of a variety of market and governmental
failures. This approach, like all good philosophy, can be very beautiful in the sense of its
logical elegance, it contains within it some great brainteasers of the sort beloved by econ-
omists and logic-choppers in general, it ties the practice of health economics firmly into
the mainstream of welfare economics and thereby gives us handles for discriminating
between 'good' and 'bad' examples of the art as practised in the literature. It also provides
some intellectual underpinnings for a fairly rarefied form of libertarian politics, and it
seems to be the approach adopted by at least half of the world's academic economists.
The other approach is pragmatic and somewhat ad hoc. It too begins with primi-
tive axioms but these are not of the formal kind that constitute the elementary propo-
sitions upon which the edifice of welfare economics syllogisms is then built. The most
basic of these is an assumption that it is someone other than the economist who pos-
sesses (usually through a political process, such as popular democracy, recognised by
the analyst to be a legitimate process) the ethical authority to stipulate the objective of
any system, of which the health care system in a jurisdiction is but one. It is this
approach that I call 'extra-welfarism'. This approach can also be elegant, though it sev-
ers itself pretty much from the root of mainstream welfare economics, and hence
does not have its magnificently elegant superstructure of theorems, including the
impossibility theorems and second best theorems. It is inherently less stable, because
its ethical foundation rests upon an external source like 'a minister' which is itself
inherently unstable. It raises different brainteasers, for example, those that arise from
the probability that different 'ministers' will have different and mutually conflicting
objectives measured, moreover, by quite different metrics so that for practical purpos-
es the analyst is more or less permanently locked into a sub-optimising routine or per-
haps into mere taxonomising. These objectives may also have quite different claims
upon our ethical impulses. It raises its own interesting brands of puzzle, such as the
construct validity of 'health' and the adequacy of empirical approximations to it, the
extent to which preferences (whose?) count at all in practical analyses, or the range
of opportunities across which opportunity cost is assessed (are health care costs to be
evaluated with respect to resources uses outside the health care sector?) and it raises
questions about how the efficiency analysis of other sectors, with which the health
care sector competes for resources, should be appraised, their outcomes compared
and valued, and their budgets determined. 
An attraction of the approach is that it is much more likely to be attuned to the
issues as seen by the ultimate clients of economic analyses  other than economists
themselves  and even the language of analysis is likely to be more easily communi-
cable to that great raft of humanity whom we collectively refer to as 'non-economists'
 including ministers, their agents and research collaborators from other disciplines.
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2006/290
SOME ROOTS OF EXTRA-WELFARISM
Several ideas seem to provide the seeds from which extra-welfarism has grown. One
was sown by Tobin (1970). He argued that the desire for equality is specific rather than gen-
eral (coining the term 'specific egalitarianism') and that some basic goods and services (like
health care) are, as a matter of empirical fact, commonly thought to be more properly allo-
cated in egalitarian ways than others. Similar ideas are met in other disciplines like philos-
ophy, such as the notion of 'basic goods' used by Rawls (1971) though he explicitly exclud-
ed both health and health care from the list of 'primary goods'. In the early development of
health economics there was much discussion as to the extent to which health care was 'dif-
ferent' from other goods and services: the consensus seems to have been that 'health' and
health care are subject to so many of the standard cautions against reliance of free markets
methods of production and distribution that they are, indeed, different from the general run
of goods, services and characteristics  partly because each specific feature often looms
large (severe information asymmetry, agency, inherent monopoly, absence of prices,
incompleteness of markets, moral hazard, adverse selection, externality, publicness, equi-
ty) and partly because few other goods and services, if any, possess so comprehensive a
collective set of challenges to efficiency and equity in resource allocation.
A second seed was sown in public finance in the shape of 'merit goods' (Musgrave,
1959): goods that need not be public goods but that are deemed so 'meritorious' that
they ought to be subsidized by the state  though what qualified such goods as 'meri-
torious' was never quite clear, nor was it fully clear how these goods differed from
goods whose consumption generated externalities (Culyer 1971). 
A third, especially influential, seed was sown by Sen (1979, 1980, 1986) in arguing that
a focus on mere individual utility was too narrow and ought to be replaced by a broader
perspective that took account of the quality of utility and focused on people's capabilities
rather than the emotional reaction (i.e. utility) of individuals to the possession of goods. 
A fourth seed might be regarded as the explicit rejection of strict welfarist economics by
governments. Some governments are very explicit about the proper role of willingness to pay
in estimating social benefits of services. In the UK, for example, we have on ministerial
authority that: 'The purpose of the NHS is to secure through the resources available the great-
est possible improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England [and]...
aims to judge its results under three headings: equity, efficiency, and responsiveness'
(Department of Health, 1996). Nothing about willingness to pay there!  In the face of such
explicit statements from politically authoritative sources it seems curmudgeonly for econo-
mists to insist on the standard assumptions of welfare economics, with which such state-
ments conflict, and which have only the moral authority, such as it is, of economists.
A fifth significant seed was the 'decision-making' approach to cost-benefit analysis
suggested by Sugden and Williams (1978) through which they contrasted the Paretian
approach with its embodiment of 'individual sovereignty' with one in which 'decision-
makers' were the source of values (and weights) in public decision-making. 
Underlying all these views may be the idea that public decision makers, in acting as
agents for their clients, the public, ought to act not as they think the principals whom they
represented would actually act, but rather as they think these principals ought to act.
Whether or not so fundamental a form of paternalism actually does underlie these views
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is a conjecture I shall merely suggest for the present but it seems to have the potential for
a newly-enriched development of principal-agent theory  the idea of the agent as a 'moral'
agent.
HEAD TO HEAD COMPARISON  WELFARISM VS EXTRA-WELFARISM
The standard sorts of intellectual journey that economists have made have a common
root but, beyond a certain stage, diverge. I think they go something like this:
(a) Primitive proposition normative economics is done to serve the social good
i
(b) The social good depends (only?) on characteristics of (all?) individuals, the distribution of these char-
acteristics and (possibly) the nature of the interrelationships between individuals
i
(c) The social good can be conceived as quantifiable, in the sense of being measurable up to a linear
transformation, and as being some kind of (weighted?) sum of the things on which the social good
depends (only?) on
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2006/292
(d) Realising the social good equates 
to maximising welfare (satisfaction? Well-being? 
Happiness? Ophelimity?)
i
(e) Welfare is a function (only?) of individual 
'preferences' (these may be 'true', 'underlying', 
'stated',  preferences)
i
(f) The relevant preferences are (only?) those over
goods and services or (possibly?) 
the characteristics of goods and services
i
(g) Preferences can be revealed (approximately)
either through market transactions or through 
experiments
i
(h) Preference equates to 'utility'
i
(i) Decisions can be informed by 
the agenda-setting/question-provoking, 
taxonomising methods of CEA etc.¡
i
(j) Distributional concerns or interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare (utility) cannot be addressed
with Paretianism¡
i
(k) Public decisions can be modelled or 'made'
through algorithmic processes like CEA (which may
embody other algorithms, like QALYs)
Realising the social good equates to optimising over
an eclectic set of characteristics of individuals or
groups of individuals ('welfare' can be one of them,
'health' another) 
i
The constituents of the social good are context-
dependent and determined by an 'ethical authority'
for that context (e.g. the 'minister of health') 
i
While preferences may be important, other 
considerations (feelings? Capacities? Capabilities?
Values? Interests? Perceptions? Relationships?
Processes?) may also have significance
i
Some elements may be revealed (approximately)
through transactions or experiments, others may be
assessed better through other methods such 
as deliberation (or with a combination of methods)
i
Preference-based utility is but one consideration
i
Decisions can be informed by the 
agenda-setting/question-provoking, taxonomizing
methods of CEA etc.
i
Distributional concerns or interpersonal 
comparisons of subjective states may be an important
part of the analysis, though there is precious little
guidance as to how they are to be addressed and
how combined with efficiency criteria
i
Public decisions can be informed by algorithmic
processes but often need to be supplemented by
deliberative processes that are context dependent to
assist the process of conflict resolution over values, to
weigh up the significance of other contributors to the
social good and to carry conviction with 'the public'
STEP (A)
Step (a) contains a primitive proposition of the sort that establishes a normative con-
text for the analysis and implies the existence of an entity called 'society'. Like any such
point of departure, it is taken largely uncritically (indeed the primitive statement is often
left implicit) and most of the debates that take place are downstream from it. I am hop-
ing that my rendition of will not prove controversial either as a statement 'in its own
right' or as the kind of statement that does indeed underlie most of what has usually
been called 'welfare economics'. In this way I propose to let this sleeping dog lie,
tempting though it might be, having made the implicit explicit, to chase some of the
possibilities (for example, that in serving the social good, economists are doing the will
of God  for example, by obeying the second great Christian-Judaeo commandment).
STEP (B)
Step (b), which says what it is that the social good depends on, requires greater
courage as it involves making a leap. Although most economists seem to have little dif-
ficulty with it, there are others who object, for example, on grounds that it is too reduc-
tionist, or not post-modern. In any event, Step (b) is an assertion that is not necessar-
ily entailed by Step (a). The emphasis that economists typically put on the character-
istics of individuals, their distribution across individuals, and the nature of the interre-
lationships between individuals (like whether they are loving or respectful or trusting,
or hate-filled, inconsiderate or suspicious) varies a good deal. But what is overwhelm-
ingly the case is that the focus is on individuals. There is not a notion amongst most
economists of the social good that is grounded elsewhere.
STEP (C)
Step (c) provides the means by which most economists do their work: it permits mar-
ginal analysis; it addresses the 'adding-up' problem, both of the characteristics that are
asserted in Step (b) for one individual and of the resultant sums across many individ-
uals. The question 'which individuals?' is usually left unaddressed in any systematic
way. The usual presumption seems to be one of inclusivity, though sometimes expli-
cit exclusions are encountered  such as children, the crazed, the unconscious or the
irrational (the latter does not necessarily correspond to those who do not obey the
axioms of expected utility theory, presumably on the grounds that such an exclusion
would be altogether too comprehensive for comfort, but it does open the door to
tedious discussions of what else economists mean when they refer to rationality). 
STEP (D)
At Step (d) there is a decided branching. This is not a branching according to the respec-
tive weight attached to efficiency relative to distributive equity, nor is it a branching that dif-
ferentiates economists who are well-disposed to the market from those who are not, nor
one that decisively settles the question of 'which individuals?' or the 'adding-up' problem.
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The differentiation is of a different kind (though it may have consequences for the views
one takes of efficiency and equity, or of markets and pseudo- or non-markets), and it
relates to the character of the entities to be maximised or equitably distributed. Down the
left-hand column is what I understand to be the conventional route of welfare economics.
This is welfarism (at least, it is welfarism of a sort) with the social good being more pre-
cisely located in terms of the satisfaction of preferences and where welfare, well-being,
satisfaction, happiness, ophelimity and so on, while not being synonyms or even ple-
sionyms, are all taken as conceptual bed-fellows, the bed being the procrustean one of that
state of mind called 'preference', and the fellows being allowed to be quite diverse, though
united by their common respect for individual preferences (and not much else). On the
right hand side we find a much more tentative and open-ended line of enquiry in which
welfare, in any of the senses on the left hand side, can count as one  but only one  of a
set of characteristics of individuals or groups. Groups need to be there because of the pos-
sibility that one may wish to include some characteristics of relationships between individ-
uals in the idea of the social good. In this specific sense, extra-welfarism might allow 'soci-
ety' to be more than merely a collection of atomistic individuals  Although the right hand
side approach may entail maximising some function of these diverse entities, it may not go
so far (stopping, for example, at listing and measuring the variables in question) or it may
take a fuzzier approach (satisficing, for example). Its very eclecticism is intuitively attrac-
tive to a pragmatist (like me) who wants any policy advice he or she gives to be as respon-
sive as possible to the reasonable demands of policy customers, but it also attractive to any
(again like me) who want to associate the idea of the social good with human experiences
and characteristics other than those normally subsumed under the heading of 'welfare'.
Eclectic candidates might include ability to adapt to changing circumstances, achieve-
ments, aspirations, assurances and reassurances, being appreciated, capabilities, capaci-
ties to benefit, entering or leaving 'states of being', fearing or not fearing for the public safe-
ty of one's children, fears in general, feelings, participation in processes of many kinds,
security, senses of belonging and self-worth, senses of membership in a kindly and mutu-
ally supportive society, virtue, and other such things, most of which  indeed I think prob-
ably all  can be measured, albeit with varying degrees of construct validity, in accordance
with the prescriptions of Step (c). 
The opening up of so disparate a range of considerations is likely to provoke
two kinds of response from economists following the left hand side. One is to say
that the entire scheme is preposterously ambitious; far better to exercise some
modesty by recognising that the economist's role is restricted to a narrower set of
considerations that we may call 'economic welfare' and the rest are someone
else's business. The counter to this is twofold. First, it may be  and it often actu-
ally is  business that no one else is around to pick up. Second, economists rarely
hedge their advice, whether about the operation of markets in general or of those
in or connected with the health care sector, by disclaimers about all the relevant
considerations they are ignoring. The modesty, in short, is a sham and the rest of
the world is invited to accept policy prescriptions that appear, at least on some
occasions, as grotesque, like the appropriateness (to use Uwe Reinhardt's telling
example (Reinhardt 1998)) of the efficiency of poor and sickly baby Smith con-
suming a small fraction of the health care of rich and healthy baby Chen. This is,
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2006/294
of course, an invitation that the perceptive amongst them will decline even though
they earn thereby the scorn of my more supercilious economist colleagues. 
The other kind of response from the left-leaning (in the columnar sense) economist is
to say that all the 'extras' that right-leaning economists want to allow, least in principle, are
as admissible on the left as they are on the right, in that there are preferences over them
all  we can even have preferences over preferences  and utility numbers are readily avail-
able to be assigned to them by well-known experimental methods. I recall Joan Robinson's
dismissive characterisation of utilitarian economic theory (I don't know if she ever wrote
this down) as essentially telling us that 'people carry on doing whatever they are doing until
they feel inclined to stop'. I am not so dismissive of utilitarianism as that (which does miss
the serious point that utility theory, viewed positively, actually has refutable and therefore
testable implications), though I have little time for those who solipsistically go to the reduc-
tio ad absurdam of reducing everything to a 'preference' and every difficult choice to a util-
itarian trade-off  as though there really were no difference between the questions 'what
do I, a person with preferences, want to do?' and 'what ought I to do, I wanting to be
behave morally?' or as if there were not a possible  even frequent  conflict between the
two answers. The reductio would be one way of re-writing Hamlet but it has no evident
attractions to any playgoer. It also leads to the absurd Panglossian conclusion that all is at
all times for the best in the world, otherwise it would have changed, but if it didn't, then
the expected utility of the world changed must have been less than the expected utility of
the world kept constant, the gainers evidently could not compensate the losers, and the
costs of reducing the transaction costs that may have impeded some transactions must
have been higher than the combined surplus to be had from making the transactions that
were not made  otherwise those costs would have been incurred and the transactions
thus enabled would have been executed (Culyer 1984).
A clear danger in the right hand column arises from the risk of double-counting or
over- and under-accounting. Whereas there are standard procedures for avoiding these
biasing distortions in conventional welfare economics, so transfers and sunk costs are
not confused with opportunity costs, or increased property values are not added to the
value of shortened commuting times, the opportunities for missing such effects on the
right is much enhanced by the plethora of possible elements. Avoidance requires clarity
about the elements and an understanding of how they may be empirically associated.
Step (d) is the point at which there seems to be a clear separation of 'welfarism'
and 'extra-welfarism'. I am using the term 'extra-welfarism' here in order to differenti-
ate it from a more extreme 'non-welfarism' (Kaplow and Shavell, 2001; Dolan and
Olsen 2002) which appears to deny the relevance of any part of the welfarist pro-
gramme (and preferences in particular) in helping to identify the social good. 
STEP (E)
In Step (e) we approach more nearly the actual entities in terms of which any appraisal of
what is good for society is to be performed. In the left hand column, we explicitly lay bare
the roots of welfarism in preference relations with the tentative suggestion that welfare is
dependent only on the satisfaction of preferences, with some acknowledgment of the fact
that 'preferences' are not self-evident and generally have to be inferred via fairly precarious
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chains of reasoning from behaviours of one kind or another. The basis of welfare in pref-
erences is, however, essentially stipulative and a priori. On the right hand side we may still
retain welfare in the preferential sense but its retention is conditional on the nature and cir-
cumstances of the decisions to be made. The ethical authority comes not from a stipula-
tive condition about what welfare is, but from a different kind of stipulation  one that stip-
ulates an ethical arbiter or a process through which such an arbiter is to be identified. To
illustrate the difference, it would be natural for someone on the left to articulate 'welfare
economics insists that ' whereas someone on the right might articulate 'the ministers
insists that '. Whether one feels bound by either of these insistencies will clearly depend
on a number of factors, including one's acceptance of the ethical underpinnings for 'wel-
fare economics' on the one hand and the ethical standing of 'the minister' on the other. In
the one case, the ethics come from the characteristics of the axioms; in the other from the
legitimacy of the arbiter- such as whether she has been elected. Essentially, the right hand
side substitutes a process (a stipulator or a method of finding one) for an algorithm.
STEP (F)
The left hand side of Step (f) has two variants: preferences are considered to be either over
goods and services or over characteristics of goods and services (examples might be their
effectiveness, convenience and responsiveness). On the right hand side such preferences
may also be important but other factors may also be deemed relevant such as the employ-
ment conditions of those delivering the services or whether the service delivery team
treats patients as partners in a treatment and rehabilitation process. Some utilitarians on
the left include 'process' in principle and that is a somewhat less restrictive form of wel-
farism than that delineated in the table. It is plainly possible for hybrid forms to exist and
there is little advantage to be had from polarising the approaches more drastically than is
necessary or than corresponds to the usual practices of applied economists. The potential
for divergence is, however, at least as great as that for convergence and will depend upon
the contingencies that seem important to the 'authority' on the right.
STEP (G)
Step (g) concerns the measurement of the sources of welfare. On the left, preferences
may be inferred from market transactions or through experiments in either real (rela-
tive) terms or by a monetary yardstick  willingness to pay or willingness to accept. On
the right, the same techniques and inferences may be drawn for preferences deemed
relevant; some of them may also prove suitable for measuring and valuing non-prefer-
ence elements (for example, limits placed on the application of the 'rule of rescue' or
the discovery of distributional weights from economic experiments); but there will often
be other considerations that are deemed relevant and that may require altogether dif-
ferent mechanisms of empirical inference and appraisal through, for example, consul-
tation and negotiation (for example, the short term service impact of a new addition to
the drug formulary on GPs and pharmacies and its managerial implications or working
out in committee an agreed formula for ranking needs, or whether a proposed alloca-
tion mechanism may be seen as an embarrassing political symbol or precedent). 
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More fundamentally, the experimental economics and psychology literatures have
revealed major ambiguities in what we may understand by 'preference' which partly have
impact on the meanings one attaches to 'rationality', partly suggest that 'real' preferences (if
they can be said to exist at all) are virtually impossible to reveal, and which also seem to
make whatever it is that experiments and like mechanisms reveal highly contingent on cir-
cumstances  not merely the circumstances of birth and development of the subject but the
immediate circumstances under which whatever is being revealed is revealed  framing
effects and the like. All of these seem to cast serious doubt on the merit of deriving the basic
value content of public policy in health care upon 'preferences'. However, they also open up
the tantalising possibility of systems for ordering public policy options that make no pre-
tence at accuracy of portraying preferences or people's states of mind and that might even
go further and be the ranking decisions of committees based upon whatever virtues are
deemed acceptable by the 'authority' but which still obey the standard assumptions of util-
ity theory  completeness, transitivity, continuity, convexity and non-satiation. It seems an
attractive quality of a public health policy mechanism that it ought to aim in some way to
reflect what seem to be the preferences of stakeholders (especially the general public and
those most directly affected by health care  patients and their families). But it ought also
do more than this and embody a distinct set of values, for which decision makers would be
accountable, and which would resemble utilities in their form and structure but would not
be seeking to represent 'preferences' and would therefore be interpreted differently.
STEP (H)
Step (h) contains several causes of potential confusion. Because of the greater inclu-
sivity of the right hand column the utility measures appropriate to the left hand column
may also be relevant on the right. However, the stipulator on the right may also require
utility measures of non-preference entities and, when this is the case, the differences
between the two columns become blurred. Or it may be stipulated that the utilities in
question be indeed those representing preferences but they may be the preferences
of a particular group of individuals and not those of some other group. The problem
here is that 'utility' is doing more work than it can normally bear. For example, in
addressing the matter of health outcomes one might:
¢ Ask the following to assign utility numbers according to a conventional experi-
mental method to states of health-related quality of life:
 Doctors
 Patients with the specified condition
 All patients
 Taxpayers
 Informal carers
where the subjects may be members of the class described and asked to assign
their own values or be non-members but asked to assign numbers putting them-
selves in the shoes of those indicated.
¢ Assign utility numbers in the foregoing experiment and its variants according to
the subjects' view of
 The desert of the probable beneficiaries
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 The productivity of the probably beneficiaries
 The likely income generated for the service providers
In each of these cases, the term 'utility' may be entirely appropriate in, say, the con-
ventional sense of the experiment requiring ordering systems to be used that are char-
acterized by completeness, transitivity, continuity, convexity and non-satiation. But the
normative significance is again quite different according as to who is doing the assign-
ing, whose utility is being measured  if anyone's  and according as to whether utili-
ty is being used as an index of health, or need, or of some other desideratum that
enables decision makers to prioritise their use of resources.
Despite the fact that 'utility' has no necessary normative content at all, even when
it is used as an indicator of preference, the fact that it has for so long been linked with
preference, and the fact that by definition in normative economics it does have a nor-
mative connotation, can condition us into thinking that it belongs firmly on the left. It
is more properly seen as a part of the armamentarium of both columns but, on the
right, and with no necessary attachment to 'preferences'.
STEP (I)
Step (i) identifies an underrated virtue of economics, which is its rather comprehen-
sive categorisations of elements for a decision maker to consider: the critical signifi-
cance of 'perspective',  the sources of bias in signals about values and what can be
done about them, the range to consider of possible consequences both anticipated
and unanticipated, external effects, publicness of goods and bads, the insights to be
had from sensitivity analyses, the distinction between (and therefore searching testing
of) elements claimed to be 'fixed' rather than 'variable', the idea of opportunity cost
and its meaning in the presence and absence of market signals, the idea that speed of
implementation is a determinant of cost, and so on. This is a feature that appears in
both columns. There is likely to be a difference, however, in the way that these con-
siderations affect an analysis. Since the right hand column is the more inclusive col-
umn, it must imply that some of the elements in a choice that may be thrown up in an
initial brainstorming session using an economic 'checklist' would be deemed 'beyond'
the scope of an economic analysis that was to be conducted according to the rules of
the left hand column. Presumably, their full consideration takes place elsewhere, at
tables at which no economists qua economists are seated.
The idea of economic analysis as a question-posing, or taxonomizing, rather than
as a problem-solving exercise is intriguing  though not an idea that essentially differ-
entiates left from right in my schema. It defines, perhaps, a role for economists that
ought more frequently to be brought into the open, not least because it is a role that
may not necessarily be extended beyond the agenda-setting phase. 
STEP (J)
Step (j) is not really a step in the Paretian scheme at all, since interpersonal compar-
isons of subjective experiences, such as 'welfare' or 'utility', are excluded by design. In
less stringent applications some have urged the use of unitary weights (e.g.
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Harberger's third postulate in Harberger (1971)). The approach adopted to date by
those on the right is scarcely more advanced however. Harberger (1978) explicitly ana-
lyzed the qualitative effects of differential weights in the use of consumer's and pro-
ducer's surplus in cost-benefit analysis, though without analysis of the source of such
weights. Advice from, for example, NICE includes: treating unitary weights as provi-
sional, conducting sensitivity analyses to test the impact of alternative weight on the
application of a decision rule, taking account of the views of advisory bodies on spe-
cific distributional questions, conducting research into the distributional values that
are held by the public, and embodying these concerns in the deliberative processes
that translate economic and other evidence into practical advice for policy and profes-
sional practice, rather than embodying them in the economic evidence itself. 
The main impediment to progress in this area seems to lie in the fact that whereas
the idea of 'efficiency' seems relatively simple and commands consensus, the same
cannot be said for matters of distributional concern, where rival concepts abound and
disagreement is rife. In the absence of unambiguous guidance from 'the authority' - or
at least guidance given unambiguous interpretation by analysts - it seems to be no
obvious escape from this difficulty and 'deliberation', informed wherever possible by
research into the values actually held by relevant stakeholders, seems the best way
forward.
STEP (K)
Step (k) contains a more striking contrast between the two columns and develops the
point just made about process. I may have overdrawn the distinction between algo-
rithms and processes, but I think it is a real one which accords to the left hand column
a more deterministic form of analysis than the right hand column. Both will employ
algorithms and models but the right hand column emphasises that the agenda, or
parts of it at least, may be best addressed and resolved through a deliberative process.
This is not quite the same as a consultative process. Through consultative processes
one can gain information, even scientific information (if the consulting is done in a sci-
entific way, for example by commissioning some economists to discover people's will-
ingnesses to pay for additional QALYs), but the final decision is bound to be deter-
mined by the combining of what Jonathan Lomas and I have called context-free sci-
entific evidence, context-sensitive scientific evidence and colloquial evidence (Lomas
et al. 2005, Culyer and Lomas 2006). The difference between the first of these is well-
illustrated by the difference between RCTs and pragmatic trials, the former being
rather good (one hopes) at establishing internal validity and the latter (again, one
hopes) at establishing external validity. Colloquial evidence is not scientific evidence
at all, though frequently it is the only form of evidence available to a decision maker.
It typically consists of 'case studies', guesses about what the political and other con-
straints on the scope of a decision may be, 'expert opinion' (which may be scientifical-
ly collected but which is still a species of gossip - systematically collected gossip).
Weighing all these matters up is, I conjecture, better done through a deliberative
process involving the relevant 'stakeholders'. I also conjecture that the consideration
of matters of equitable concern is also most fruitfully done in a deliberative fashion,
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especially if they are controversial. To the extent that this is true, economists become
much more intimately involved in  and responsible for  public policy resource allo-
cation decisions. The phenomenon is well-illustrated by the way in which NICE's
Appraisal Committees work. This may not be a necessary consequence of a delibera-
tive process but it seems to be a highly likely one, particularly if it is thought important
for any decisions resulting from the process to be both evidence-informed and to have
high public and political credibility. Moreover, the higher the reputational standing of
the participating experts, including the economists, the better.
SOME QUESTIONS TO WHICH I DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWERS
Economists have listed many reasons why health is 'different' from other characteris-
tics of people, or health care is different from other services. A system of health care
can even be emblematic for an entire nation, as is the case for Canadians, a geograph-
ically widespread and culturally diverse people, whose health care system is widely
regarded as not only the outward and visible sign of a shared set of clearly articulated
and unifying principles, but also as iconic in differentiating Canadian values from
those of its nearest neighbour. These values recognise that health is too important to
allow gross inequalities to persist in it, and that the full flourishing of humans depends
largely, if not exclusively, on their enjoyment of reasonable health. They also elevate
the application of cost-effectiveness analysis to health care technologies to an alto-
gether higher moral plane, for neither inequity nor inefficiency is tolerable in a human
characteristic (flourishing) of such fundamental importance. These broader consider-
ations suggest a range of more specific questions for economists to address. I shall
simply list some of the more obvious ones and make no attempt to answer them:
¢ Is it possible to make general statements about the types of decision that deter-
mine the balance of algorithmic and deliberative resolution of value questions?
¢ Is it desirable, supposing it to be possible, to retain any element of preference-
based welfarism in cost-effectiveness and related techniques of analysis?
¢Where it is decided to go beyond, or simply to circumnavigate, preferences (one
might say 'extra-preferentially') what kinds of ethical authority ought we to seek?
¢ How are controversies over interpersonal weights to be resolved and any such
resolution embodied in economic analyses?
¢Without a foundation of 'preferences' what role is there for 'utility'?
¢What kind of accountability to the general public is required?
¢ Supposing that we also want (or are instructed by 'the authority') to keep public
policy in line with common values in society, how best do we do this (invite com-
ments, use consultation, citizens' juries, markets or pseudo-markets ...?)
¢ How do we build a coherent extra-welfarist theory of optimality in the public sec-
tor, or even the economy as a whole, when there are different ethical authorities
for each sector, differently measured objectives for each with varying degrees of
construct validity, separate budgets and sub-budgets each of which constrains
choice and generates opportunity costs that are sector specific and each of
which may be non-optimal in either or both welfarist or extra-welfarist terms?
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